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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Driving a motor vehicle is essential to functional independence, as it enables 
access to work, shopping, health care, and social activities (Bodenheimer, Roig, 
Worsowicz, & Cifu, 2004; Marshall et al., 2007, O’Neill, 2000; Poole, Chaudry, & Jay, 
2008; & Ragland, Satariano, & MacLeod, 2005). Most adults are understandably 
resistant to cease or restrict their driving because of the subsequent loss of autonomy, 
spontaneity, and flexibility. Driving was rated by community dwelling elderly as the 
second most important activity of daily living, preceded only by telephone use (Fricke & 
Unsworth, 2001). Driving represents cherished independence and is a sign of health 
and well-being, and retaining the ability to drive is an important health concern 
(Edwards, Perkins, Ross, & Reynolds, 2009). Approximately 40-60% of acquired brain 
injury (ABI) survivors, including stroke (Griffen, Rapport, Coleman Bryer, & Scott, 2009; 
Heikkila, Korpelainen, Turkka, Kallanranta, & Summala, 1999) and traumatic brain injury 
(TBI) (Coleman, Rapport, Ergh, Hanks, Ricker, & Millis, 2002; Fisk, Schneider, & 
Novack, 1998; Schanke & Sundet, 2000), regain their drivers’ licenses and resume 
driving. Nearly two-thirds, however, do not complete a driver’s evaluation to assess their 
driving abilities prior to returning to driving (Fisk, Schneider, & Novack, 1998). Even 
following ABI, many survivors resume driving without increased risk of injury or accident 
(Schultheis, Matheis, Nead, & DeLuca, 2002). Awareness of cognitive and physical 
limitations may invoke use of compensatory strategies to promote safe resumption of 
driving. Understanding the links between awareness of deficits, use of compensatory 
strategies, and driving performance will enable better prediction of safe drivers following 
ABI.  
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Driving is a complex task requiring the use of multiple cognitive abilities in 
addition to adequate visual acuity and motor function (Lister, 1999; Lundqvist & 
Ronnberg, 2001; Marshall et al., 2007). Cognitive functions necessary for safe driving 
include sustained and divided attention, visual perception, judgment, and executive 
control. In order to drive safely, a person must be able to make automatic motor 
responses with a quick response time, be flexible with different circumstances, and 
have quick judgment to deal appropriately with difficult traffic situations (Lundqvist & 
Ronnberg, 2001). Galski, Bruno, and Ehle (1992) developed a dynamic model of driving 
for ABI survivors that includes the interaction of sensory input, information processing, 
driving experience, and motor skills. When ABI results in impairments in any of these 
components, driving safety may be compromised. Yet, many survivors of ABI are fit to 
drive in spite of cognitive and perceptual impairments (Brouwer & Withaar, 1997). 
Awareness of these impairments may be the key to safe driving following brain injury. 
Because driving is an important part of independence in our society and cessation of 
driving is undesirable for most people, it is important to understand as much as possible 
about what is required for safe driving, including awareness of deficits following ABI and 
use of compensatory strategies.  
Methods for Assessing Fitness to Drive 
On-road Evaluations 
The on-road evaluation is considered the gold standard method for assessing 
fitness to drive in persons with disability (Fox, Bowden, & Smith, 1998; Galski, Bruno, & 
Ehle, 1992; Reger, Welsh, Watson, Cholerton, Baker & Craft, 2004). On-road driving 
tests are the most ecologically valid assessment of driving abilities. A driving evaluator 
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can observe the patient in a variety of driving situations, such as parking lots, residential 
streets, expressways, and high traffic volumes, in order to gather a well-rounded 
perspective on the patient’s driving abilities and risky behaviors. Limitations of on-road 
tests include uncontrollable traffic and road conditions, as well as the cost of 
evaluations; however, the main limitation is the insufficient volume and inadequate 
design of research on the reliability, validity, and standardization of the on-road 
evaluation (Fox, Bowden, & Smith, 1998; Reger et al., 2004). Lundqvist, Gerdle, and 
Ronnberg (2000) found excellent inter-rater reliability (r =.96) for driving inspectors 
conducting driving evaluations. In a recent study of 100 older adults, Rasch analysis 
showed good evidence of inter-rater reliability and construct validity and some evidence 
for internal reliability of an on-road driving evaluation (Kay, Bundy, Clemson, & Jolly, 
2008). Despite potential variability in on-road evaluations, they are still viewed as the 
optimal driving assessment and are regularly used by rehabilitation facilities because 
actual on-road driving is the most ecologically valid means of assessing fitness to drive. 
As compared to actual on-road driving tests, driving simulators afford advantages 
such as standardized stimuli and control of variables such as traffic. Simulation 
technologies can be used to present test reaction to difficult challenges that could not 
be safely or consistently presented in a real-world road test (Bieliauskas, 2005). 
However, realistic simulation technologies are unlikely to be adopted at the clinical level 
in a widespread manner because they are very costly, and research on the predictive 
validity of simulators is very sparse. 
On-road evaluations typically include assessment of pre-driving activities, 
including fastening seatbelt and adjusting seat and mirrors; driving activities, such as 
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lane placement, use of turn signals, and parking; and behavior, including impulsivity and 
distractibility (Galski, Bruno, & Ehle, 1992). The evaluations can occur in closed 
courses, on city streets and highways, or a combination of these settings.  
An important and surprising observation regarding research examining on-road 
driving evaluations is that very few studies have included a healthy control group. The 
studies that have included control groups have either been with very small sample sizes 
or on closed road courses. The inclusion of a healthy control group is valuable in that it 
can account for any potential rater bias towards the resumption of driving following an 
ABI. Additionally, a healthy control group sets normative standards and expectations for 
on-road driving evaluation performances.   
Neuropsychological Evaluations 
Neuropsychological tests have been shown to be good predictors of driving 
performance and driving outcomes in TBI (e.g., Coleman et al, 2002; Galski, Bruno, & 
Ehle, 1992), stroke (e.g., Heikkilä, et al., 1999; Lundqvist, Gerdle & Ronnberg, 2000), 
multiple sclerosis (MS) (Ryan et al., 2009), community-dwelling older adults (see Clay, 
Wadley, Edwards, Roth, Roenker, & Ball, 2005 for review), and dementia (see Reger et 
al., 2004 for review), as well as in studies combining mixed neurological populations 
(Schanke & Sundet, 2000).  Type and degree of cognitive impairment, as measured by 
neuropsychological tests, have been shown to be better predictors of actual driving 
performance than are age or medical diagnosis among individuals with dementia (Fitten 
et al., 1995). In contrast, some studies have not found a relationship between 
neuropsychological test performance and driving outcomes (Bieliauskas, Roper, Trobe, 
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Green, & Lacy, 1998; Fox, Bowden, Bashford, & Smith, 1997; Trobe, Waller, Cook-
Flannagan, Teshima, & Bieliauskas, 1996; Withaar, Brouwer, & Van Zomeren, 2000).  
These mixed findings regarding the utility of neuropsychological tests in 
predicting driving outcomes following ABI can be explained in a number of ways, 
including variation in test batteries utilized and driving outcomes chosen (e.g., DMV 
records, on-road evaluations, etc.; Coleman et al., 2002; Ryan et al., 2009). At least one 
study reported that when specific domains of neuropsychological functioning are used, 
predictions are improved as compared to using a global composite. A meta-analysis of 
outcomes for elderly drivers by Anstey, Wood, Lord, and Walker (2005) showed 
moderate to high associations for visuospatial abilities, as well as aspects of executive 
function and complex visual attention (e.g., UFOV), and small effects or mixed findings 
for other domains, including processing speed, reaction time, vision, and hearing. The 
most commonly implicated neuropsychological domains predictive of driving outcomes 
across a variety of patient populations include: visuospatial ability (Korteling & Kaptein, 
1996; Meyers, Volbrecht, & Kaster-Bundgaard, 1999; Reger et al., 2004), complex 
visual attention (Clay et al., 2005 for review; Cushman & Cogliandro, 1999; Goode et 
al., 1998; Mazer, Sofer, Korner-Bitensky, Gelinas, Hanley, & Wood-Dauphinee, 2003), 
and executive functioning (Coleman et al., 2002; Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 2000; 
Lundqvist, Alinder, Alm, Gerdle, Levander, & Ronnberg, 1997; Mazer, Korner-Bitensky, 
& Sofer, 1998; Ott, Heindel, Whelihan, Caron, Piatt, & DiCarlo, 2003; Radford & Lincoln, 
2004; Schanke & Sundet, 2000). 
The predictive value of neuropsychological tests on driving performance may 
vary depending on the type of driving outcome that has been chosen, such as non-road 
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tests, on-road tests, and DMV records. For example, Reger et al. (2004) reported that 
neuropsychological tests correlated poorly with on-road tests and higher mean effect 
sizes were found with non-road tests in their meta-analysis of patients with dementia. 
They asserted that the difference may reflect that non-road tests are more standardized 
than the more ecologically valid on-road tests. Additionally, as participants are less 
familiar with non-road tests (e.g., simulators), their cognitive flexibility and executive 
functioning may be taxed to a greater extent than in the on-road evaluation. Thus, the 
authors acknowledged that the higher effect sizes could be an artifact of the failure of 
the dementia patients to adjust to the unfamiliar testing procedures. On-road tests are 
less standardized, as the driving evaluator cannot control traffic, construction, and other 
drivers’ behaviors; yet, on-road evaluations can have adequate reliability within the 
context of real time driving (Kay et al., 2008; Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 2000).  
Another possible reason for the mixed results is the failure to account for 
awareness of deficits among those desiring to resume driving. The majority of studies 
assessing the relationship between neuropsychological performance and driving ability 
have focused primarily on visuospatial abilities, attention, reaction time, processing 
speed and memory. Despite the fact that leading theories of fitness to drive include 
executive functioning as an essential component, many studies fail to include this 
domain and its subparts, including awareness of deficits and judgment. For example, 
Michon (1985) proposed a theory of driving behavior including three levels of decision 
making involved in safe driving. The strategic level involves decisions regarding the 
planning of safe driving, which utilizes executive functioning, judgment, and memory. 
The tactical level involves decisions about present driving situations and anticipatory 
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responses that require cognitive control and flexibility. The operational level consists of 
the basic driving skills, including automatic responses, immediate reactions, and 
perceptual speed. Although Michon’s proposal posited that the three levels were of 
equal importance, most of the research has focused on the operational and tactical 
levels, neglecting the more complex strategic level. Studies that have included 
measures that require use of executive functions, such as the Trail Making Test and 
Stroop Test, have found significant relationships between test performance and driving 
abilities (Coleman et al., 2002; Heikkilä et al., 1999; Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 
2000; Lundqvist et al, 1997; Mazer, Korner-Bitensky, & Sofer, 1998; Ott et al., 2003; 
Radford & Lincoln, 2004). It is likely that the predictive value of neuropsychological tests 
would be improved if the patient’s level of awareness of their deficits was considered. 
Awareness of Deficit  
 Being aware of personal deficits requires executive functioning, including self-
monitoring, judgment, reasoning, and ability to benefit from feedback. Prigatano and 
Schacter (1991) have defined self-awareness as “the capacity to perceive the ‘self’ in 
relatively ‘objective’ terms whilst maintaining a sense of subjectivity” (p. 13). In contrast, 
unawareness of deficits reflects “an impairment in the patient’s ability to consciously 
represent (perceive and experience) a disturbance in higher cerebral functioning- a 
disruption in the integration of thinking and feeling” (Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998, p. 57). 
Unawareness of one’s limitations is a common occurrence in people with ABI, including 
stroke, TBI, Alzheimer’s disease (Prigatano, 2005), and MS (Ryan et al., 2009). This 
lack of insight into their current functional abilities or disabilities does not necessarily 
imply an indifference to or denial of their symptoms. Indifference or lack of concern is 
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indicative of a diminished affective response to illness or injury, and denial reflects a 
defense or coping mechanism aimed to alleviate distress given subconscious 
awareness of a problem or deficit (Giacino & Cicerone, 1998; McGlynn & Schacter, 
1989). Anosognosia is a term that can appropriately be interchanged with unawareness 
of deficit; it means “without knowledge of disease” (Hartmann-Maeir, Soroker, Oman, & 
Katz, 2003). “Anosognosia” was first coined by Babinski (1914; as cited in Vuilleumier, 
2004) to describe an individual’s lack of knowledge, awareness, or recognition of their 
physical disease. Anosognosia has been defined more recently as “the condition of a 
patient affected by a brain dysfunction who does not recognize the presence or 
adequately appreciate the severity of deficits in sensory, perceptual, motor, affective, or 
cognitive functioning evident to clinicians and caregivers” (Orfei, Robinson, Bria, 
Caltagirone, & Spalletta, 2008 p. 204).   
 Awareness of deficit can be operationalized as the difference between a 
person's self-assessment and those of an accurate external criterion of the person's 
ability. One common method of measurement employs as the external criterion a 
knowledgeable informant, typically a significant other (SOs) such as a spouse, family 
member, or close friend (Coleman et al., 2002; Prigatano, 2005). Fordyce and Roueche 
(1986) have shown that caregiver reports are more predictive of ABI survivors’ 
functioning than are the survivors’ own self-assessments of their abilities. Furthermore, 
agreement tends to be greater among family and clinician ratings of the survivors’ 
abilities than among these sources of ratings and the survivors’ self-ratings (Sherer, 
Bergloff, Boake, High, & Levin, 1998a).   
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Practically, the behavioral pattern of anosognosia following TBI, stroke, and 
dementia may be similar, including a complete disavowal of symptoms or partial 
awareness of difficulties with causal misattribution (e.g., fatigue, arthritis, etc.), poor 
compliance with rehabilitation, modality specificity, such that the patient is aware of 
functional limitations in some areas and demonstrate unawareness in others, and 
graded levels of severity of unawareness. Unawareness of deficit can improve, 
especially during the acute phases of stroke and TBI; however, it is not uncommon in 
the chronic stages following these events. Unawareness of deficits following TBI has 
been thought to be wider reaching, including motor, cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
problems, than in stroke, which is often considered to be primarily a lack of awareness 
of physical deficits. In contrast to stroke and TBI, awareness problems often increase in 
severity during the course of dementia (Orfei et al., 2008). Although there are 
similarities in anosognosia following these conditions, variability may occur in symptom 
presentation both between and within these disorders.  
 Numerous theories have been proposed postulating various mechanisms or 
components involved in self-awareness. These theories distinguish between 
psychological and neuropsychological/cognitive factors and levels of awareness. 
Fleming and Strong (1995) proposed three levels of awareness, including knowledge of 
deficits, functional implications of those deficits, and realistic expectations in predicting 
performance. Flashman, Amador, and McAllister (1998) added the concept of an 
emotional response to the deficit in their theory of self-awareness. Similarly, Allen and 
Ruff (1990) proposed three levels of processing that affected accuracy in self-reporting. 
The first level, labeled awareness, requires the ability to attend to, encode, and retrieve 
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information relating to the self, which is primarily a neuropsychological process. 
Appraisal, the second level, requires the patient to compare current information about 
the self to premorbid self-evaluations, utilizing both emotional and cognitive factors. The 
third level, disclosure, is the patient’s willingness to report self-perceptions to someone 
else, also mediated by both emotional and cognitive factors. Another three factor 
hierarchical theory of awareness was described by Crosson et al. (1989). Intellectual 
awareness is the first factor, which is the ability to recognize the presence of a deficit 
and possible implications of this impairment. The second factor is emergent awareness, 
which is the recognition of moment by moment awareness of functional limitations. 
Anticipatory awareness, the third factor, is the ability to anticipate limitations prior to 
their occurrence and invoke compensatory strategies as needed. These models and 
theories are helpful in understanding various components of awareness problems and 
may lead to improving rehabilitation care, but they fail to explain actual etiologies of the 
impairment (Orfei et al., 2008).  
Hypotheses regarding self-awareness have also focused on the relationship 
between anosognosia and brain dysfunction. Awareness is a complex phenomenon that 
requires integration from several neural networks, which have most often been cited as 
cortical areas including the prefrontal and parieto-temporal regions, most often in the 
right hemisphere but sometimes bilaterally, in association with some subcortical areas, 
including the thalamus (Orfei et al., 2008; Prigatano, 2005; Sherer, Hart, Whyte, Nick, & 
Yablon, 2005). Lesions to feedback modules in areas of the association cortex may be 
implicated in awareness problems that are modality or domain specific, whereas lesions 
to central processing areas, including the frontal lobe, may results in more generalized 
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disturbances. Damage to the connecting white matter tracts may also interfere with 
adequate self-awareness (Sherer et al., 2005). Damage to subcortical circuits may lead 
to impaired self-monitoring processes and difficulty modifying one’s beliefs and 
behaviors based on novel experiences (Vuilleumier, 2000). The variability seen in 
problems with awareness (e.g., severity, modality specificity, etc.) may be due to 
differences in the location of the damage in these circuits (Orfei et al., 2008). Sherer et 
al. (2005) found that among participants with TBIs, numbers of lesions were directly 
associated with severity of awareness problems. Further investigation is needed in this 
area to further elucidate the neuropathology associated with awareness problems. 
Research has also focused on the relationship between awareness and cognitive 
functioning and comorbid neuropsychological deficits. The domain of executive 
functioning has been the primary focus. It has been theorized that there is an executive 
or supervisory control function that directs other subordinate cognitive skills. If this 
executive control function is impaired and disrupts higher order cognitive processes, 
including self-monitoring and cognitive flexibility, deficits in self-awareness may result 
(Stuss, 1991). Starkstein and colleagues (1993) found that executive functioning deficits 
in set-shifting and flexibility were more frequent in patients with impaired self-
awareness. Furthermore, scores on executive function tasks have shown stronger 
correlations with awareness than tests of other neuropsychological domains (Burgess, 
Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998). 
Although executive functioning has been shown to be related to self-awareness 
in some studies, the findings are not conclusive. Other studies have not found 
associations between measures of self-awareness and performance on other executive 
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function tasks (Bogod, Mateer, & Macdonald, 2003; Marcel, Tegner, & Nimmo-Smith, 
2004).The discrepant findings regarding the relationship between awareness and 
measures of executive functioning may be due to the fact that they are both complicated 
and multifaceted constructs that can be challenging to operationally define.  
 No specific neuropsychological profile has been associated with problems with 
awareness. Anosognosia cannot be explained by a single lesion, neurological 
mechanism, executive function, or a simple combination of these components 
(Vuilleumier, 2004). Patients with awareness problems typically exhibit global cognitive 
deficits, including memory impairment and reduced processing speed, and it is not 
always clear as to how awareness is related to these comorbid impairments (Prigatano, 
2005). Yet, cognitive impairments are not a prerequisite for awareness problems 
(McGlynn & Schacter, 1989).  
Awareness of Deficit and Fitness to Drive  
The presence of cognitive and physical impairments does not necessarily imply 
that safe driving is unfeasible (van Zomeren, Brouwer, & Minderhoud, 1987). It is the 
lack of insight into these impairments that poses a serious safety risk. ABI survivors with 
awareness problems have a particularly difficult time accepting driving restrictions or 
cessation that may be imposed by caregivers or physicians (Ownsworth & Fleming, 
2005; Rapport, Coleman Bryer, & Hanks, 2008). In a study by Coleman et al. (2002), 
41% of TBI patients with awareness problems resumed driving. Lundqvist and Alinder 
(2007) found that ABI survivors who failed an on-road driving test significantly 
overestimated their driving performance, whereas the group who passed the on-road 
test had self-ratings in accordance with the test results. The authors posited that 
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persons who passed the on-road test may have also been more aware of their cognitive 
capacity and had a better ability to adjust their driving behaviors as compared to those 
who failed the evaluation; however, this hypothesis was not tested directly.  
The clinical issue is then which of the cognitively and physically impaired patients 
are capable of safe driving. Coleman Bryer, Rapport, and Hanks (2005) described the 
relationship between cognitive impairment and driver safety as a curvilinear distribution. 
The profoundly impaired and mildly impaired groups are considered the least risky 
because the former group is unlikely to resume driving and the latter group is only 
minimally impaired. The patients between these two groups are at the greatest risk. 
Awareness of deficits and the ability to self-monitor may moderate the level of risk in 
this group of ABI survivors. Individuals that recognize their limitations may be less likely 
to drive in unsafe situations and beyond their capabilities, thus lowering their risk of 
accident.    
Schanke and Sundet (2000) investigated the relationship between 
neuropsychological functioning, including awareness, and on-road driving performance 
in a group of individuals with various neurological disorders. They found that awareness 
of cognitive impairment showed good predictive value in discriminating between those 
who passed and failed the on-road evaluation. The patients with mild to moderate 
cognitive impairments who demonstrated awareness of their deficits passed the on-road 
evaluation more successfully than did patients who were unaware of their deficits. 
Unfortunately, this study treated awareness of deficit simply as another domain of 
neuropsychological functioning, not as a moderator of the risk of cognitive impairment 
while driving. Thus, the results do not explain why awareness of deficit enables some 
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individuals with mild to moderate cognitive deficits to drive safely, and they do not 
account for the relationship between awareness and global deficits. Having awareness 
of deficits is just the first step towards safe driving following brain injury. With that 
awareness, individuals must adjust and adapt their driving habits with the knowledge of 
their limitations. Awareness of deficits has been defined as a mechanism for change, 
allowing individuals to recognize the mismatch between their skill levels, the 
performances expected of them, and the environmental demands of the situation (Dixon 
& Backman, 1999).  
Rapport et al. (1993) found that measures of executive functioning were better 
predictors of fall risk in an inpatient setting than were measures of physical impairment 
or motor ability. The authors suggested that patients with considerable physical and 
cognitive risk factors for accidents may be at a lower risk if they appreciate the nature of 
their limitations and respond appropriately. In contrast, underappreciation of even mild 
deficits can increase risk significantly. This relationship between awareness of deficits 
and fall risk can be applied to driving as well. With regards to driving, awareness of 
cognitive, visual, and physical limitations allows an individual to self-monitor and adapt 
their driving behaviors to produce safe driving (Anstey et al, 2005). Thus, ABI survivors 
who have cognitive and physical impairments may be fit to drive if they have the 
capacity to recognize their deficits and cope effectively (Lundqvist & Alinder, 2007). If 
survivors are unaware of their deficits, they cannot invoke the appropriate 
compensatory strategies to produce safe driving. Rapport, Coleman Bryer, and Hanks 
(2008) found that TBI survivors with cognitive impairments who rated their current 
abilities as unchanged and high (e.g., suggesting unawareness of deficits) drove more 
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and had more adverse driving incidents than did survivors with adequate awareness of 
their cognitive impairments.  
Compensatory Strategies 
Compensation has been defined as “the deliberate application of a procedure 
that enables a patient to obtain a goal the realization of which would otherwise be 
prevented by impaired functioning" (Crosson et al., 1989, p.46). Unawareness of deficits 
may reduce use of compensatory strategies which may lead to decreased benefits from 
rehabilitation. In their review of the literature, Ownsworth and Clare (2006) note that 
several studies indicate that ABI survivors with awareness problems were less likely to 
benefit from rehabilitation than were individuals with accurate self-assessments. Those 
patients with awareness deficits may have reduced motivation for therapy, resist 
treatment recommendations or support, set unrealistic goals, and develop and utilize 
fewer compensatory strategies.  
The presence of awareness of deficits can moderate driving risk in individuals 
with mild to moderate cognitive impairments in that they recognize the need for and are 
able to invoke necessary compensatory strategies. In order to adequately utilize 
compensatory strategies, one must recognize the need for them (Lundqvist & Alinder, 
2007; Rapport, Coleman Bryer, & Hanks, 2008). Compensating for residual impairments 
often includes strategically limiting driving exposure, such as avoiding driving at night, 
on freeways, during times of heavy traffic or adverse weather conditions, on long trips, 
and even cease driving completely (Anstey et al., 2005; Ryan et al., 2009). Anstey et al. 
(2005) provided an excellent example of the use of compensatory strategies while 
driving. They described an older individual who was aware of his impaired reaction time 
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and slow response to traffic situations who used this knowledge to avoid driving at peak 
traffic times to increase safe driving. Anstey et al. contrasted this individual to one with a 
lack of insight into his visual deficits who continued to drive at night despite poor vision 
for road signs, resulting in risky driving behavior and increased accident risk. The 
potential for compensatory strategies to moderate accident risk has been supported by 
other investigators as well (e.g., Brouwer & Ponds, 1994; Lundqvist, Gerdle, & 
Ronnberg, 2000; Mazer, Korner-Bitensky, & Sofer, 1998). 
In a study by Schultheis et al. (2002), 14.9% of drivers with TBI independently 
elected to not return to driving after successfully completing a comprehensive driving 
evaluation. The authors suggested that these results demonstrate some drivers with TBI 
are capable of recognizing their difficulties with resuming driving safely and 
subsequently invoke compensatory strategies, including elective cessation of driving. 
Likewise, 37.5% of the TBI survivors who did resume driving reported imposing self-
limitations on their post-injury driving. van Zomeren, Brouwer, Rothengatter and Snoek 
(1988) also reported that the majority of their patients who had resumed driving 
following severe head injury stated that since their injuries they drove more carefully, 
including driving slower and avoiding driving at night and for long distances, in order to 
compensate for their assumed limitations.  
Ryan et al. (2009) found substantial inverse relationships between awareness of 
deficit and reported use of compensatory strategies among patients with MS, meaning 
that drivers who were more aware of their functional deficits were more likely to utilize 
compensatory strategies. Interestingly, the more MS patients reported using 
compensatory strategies, the fewer miles they drove per week and the fewer driving 
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incidents they experienced. This study demonstrates that awareness moderated driving 
outcomes (DMV records) through a relationship with compensatory strategies and 
driving safety among MS patients. Patients who are unaware of their deficits perceive 
less need to engage in compensatory strategies, which can in turn lead to increased 
risk for accidents.  
Summary and Purpose  
 Driving is a complex task that requires integration of multiple cognitive and 
physical abilities. Assessing fitness to drive following ABI is an essential task to ensure 
safety on the road for both the survivor and the public. The on-road driving evaluation is 
considered the gold standard assessment method. Neuropsychological assessment 
also plays a key role in assessing fitness to drive; however, research has revealed 
mixed findings regarding the relationship of test performance to driving outcomes. 
Neuropsychological test batteries for driving assessments typically focus on measures 
of visual perception and complex attention, while neglecting or minimizing the domain of 
executive function. Awareness of deficits is one key element of executive functioning 
that has been found to be related to driving outcomes. 
Being aware of deficits following ABI is a requisite condition for the survivor to 
invoke compensatory strategies in order to continue to drive safely. Conversely, a lack 
of awareness of cognitive or physical limitations may be the source of a false 
confidence and lead to risky driving behaviors. Cognitive and physical deficits do not 
invariably undermine fitness to drive. Awareness of these deficits may reduce or 
eliminate any additional risk due to these impairments by allowing the survivor to 
compensate accordingly.   
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Previous research has shown that awareness of deficit is related to driving 
outcomes; however, it has not been examined as a moderator in the relationship 
between neuropsychological test performance and on-road evaluation. Extant research 
includes studies using awareness of deficit as a subdomain of executive functioning or 
with non-road driving outcomes. As such, this study further investigated the role of 
awareness of deficit and use of compensatory strategies in the context of ABI disability 
in an on-road driving evaluation performance. Additionally, this study improved upon the 
current literature by including a healthy control group for purposes of comparison and 
addressing any possibility of methodological bias in the on-road evaluation. The 
following hypotheses were proposed: 
1. Awareness of deficits directly affects fitness to drive:  
a. Survivors with awareness of their impairments would have more success on 
the on-road driving evaluation than would their counterparts with impaired 
awareness of deficits. 
b. Furthermore, it is predicted that cognitive and motor/sensory awareness 
would have greater relation to driving performance than would 
behavioral/affective awareness. 
2. Awareness of deficits moderates fitness to drive:  
a. Among ABI survivors, awareness of deficit would moderate the relationship 
between neuropsychological test performance and on-road driving evaluation. 
Among survivors with impaired awareness of deficit, neuropsychological 
performance would be strongly related to on-road performance (i.e., 
impairments in neuropsychological functioning impair driving); among 
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survivors with adequate awareness of deficits, this relationship would be null 
or small.  
b. Awareness moderates fitness to drive via invoking compensatory behaviors: 
Among ABI survivors, awareness of deficits would be positively correlated 
with use of compensatory strategies (e.g. driving limitations) and on-road 
driving performance. Likewise, unawareness of deficits would be inversely 
related to invoking compensatory strategies and subsequently to driving 
performance. Survivors who are aware of their deficits would report greater 
use of compensatory strategies, which in turn mitigates their deficits and 
benefits fitness to drive. In contrast, survivors unaware of their deficits would 
report few compensatory behaviors and would not adequately compensate for 
their impairments.  
3. SOs would be better predictors of on-road performance for survivors with impaired 
awareness of their deficits than would the survivors themselves. Among survivors 
with intact awareness, SOs and survivors would show equivalent prediction of 
survivors' on-road performance.  
4. It was expected that the control group would perform satisfactorily on the on-road 
driving evaluation and superior to the survivor group. Also, among these healthy 
controls, neuropsychological performance would not be related to on-road 
performance (i.e., due to threshold effect).  
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CHAPTER 2 METHODS 
Participants 
The sample included 62 participants with ABI and a knowledgeable informant 
about that person, and 40 healthy adults with no history of ABI. See Tables 1 and 2 for 
the demographic characteristics of the ABI survivors and healthy controls. The 
participants with histories of ABI including  31 stroke (50%), 11 TBI (17.7%), 8 MS 
(12.9%), 4 brain tumor (6.5%), and 8 mixed and other etiologies (12.9%; e.g., multiple 
neurological illnesses or injuries). Participants with ABI were recruited from the Driving 
Education and Training Center (DETC) at the Rehabilitation Institute of Michigan (RIM). 
Patients were referred to the DETC by their physicians for a driving evaluation prior to 
resumption of driving. Informant / significant others (SOs) of each of the ABI survivors 
were selected by the ABI survivors, were defined as individuals who knew the survivor 
prior to his or her ABI, and were considered to be “active” in the survivor’s life. Forty 
control participants were recruited from the community and from the SOs, to participate 
in the on-road driving evaluation and neuropsychological testing like the ABI survivors 
completed at the DETC. Exclusionary criteria for the control group included any history 
of brain injury, not having a valid driver’s license, and obtaining a score below 24 on 
The Mini Mental Status Exam (MMSE). No participants were excluded on the basis of 
these criteria. Inclusionary criteria for all participants included ability to understand 
English and be over 18 years old. Participants were compensated monetarily for their 
participation.   
 The significant others of the ABI survivors were 47 women (75.8%) and 15 men 
(24.2%) and they ranged in age from 18 to 80 years (M = 46.7 years, SD = 13.7).  Level 
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of education for the significant others ranged from 6 to 20 years (M = 13.8 years, SD = 
2.5). The relationships of the significant others to the ABI survivors were 30 spouses or 
romantic partners (48.4%), 3 parents (4.8%), 9 adult children (14.5%), 8 other relatives 
(12.9%), 10 friends (16.1%), and 2 other (3.2%). 
Measures 
Barriers to Driving Questionnaire and Driving Survey (BDQ – DS; Rapport, 
Hanks, & Coleman Bryer, 2006). The BDQ is a 40-item survey that assesses difficulties 
associated with driving following acquired disability. Aspects of interest in the present 
study include ratings of current driving ability and driving safety, which are obtained via 
5-point scales (e.g., poor, worse than average, average, better than average, excellent). 
Internal consistency reliabilities (coefficient alpha) for the subscales and the total score 
ranged from .87 to .97 (Rapport, Hanks, & Coleman Bryer, 2006).  
The Driving Survey (DS) is a modified version of a questionnaire created by 
Marcotte et al. (2000) that assesses perceptions of participants’ current levels of safety 
and skill as a driver. This portion was completed only by survivors who had resumed 
driving at the time of the present study. In addition to current driving habits, such as 
frequency and typical mileage, the scale obtains information on reported use of driving 
limitations, such as avoiding driving at night or in inclement weather. The items 
pertaining to driving limitations served as the measure of compensatory strategies for 
the present study. The DS has been shown reliable and valid among populations such 
as cognitively impaired persons with HIV (Marcotte et al., 2000) and TBI (Rapport, 
Hanks, & Coleman Bryer, 2006). The BDQ and DS have parallel versions for self-report 
and other-report. In the present study, both the BDQ and the DS were completed by the 
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ABI survivor and the SO with reference to the survivor. Reliability (coefficient alpha) for 
the Limitations scale in the present study was .91. 
The Awareness Questionnaire (AQ; Sherer et al, 1998a; Sherer, Bergloff, Levin, 
High, Oden, & Nick, 1998b). This 17-item survey was designed to measure the patients’ 
abilities to perform various tasks after injury as compared to before their injury. One 
form is completed by the survivor, and one form is completed by a SO informant. This 
interview was developed as a measure of impaired self-awareness after traumatic brain 
injury (Sherer et al., 1998b). Although the scale was originally designed for use among 
persons with traumatic brain injury, the test authors indicate that it is appropriate for use 
in populations with acquired brain injuries (Sherer et al., 1998), and it has been shown 
to be valid and reliable among populations other than TBI (Waldron-Perrine, Rapport, 
Ryan, & Telmet Harper, 2009). The AQ provides an index of awareness of deficit that is 
calculated as the discrepancy between survivors’ self-report of their cognitive, 
behavioral, and motor functioning and SOs’ perceptions of the survivors’ abilities. 
Internal consistency for the total score was reported at .88 for both survivor and SO 
samples (Sherer et al, 1998a). In the present study, reliability (coefficient alpha) for the 
self-report scale was .82, whereas reliability for the SO-report scale was .87. 
Awareness of Deficit was assessed using the AQ Difference score: The index 
defines unawareness in terms of the discrepancy between survivors' self-reports of their 
general functional abilities across a variety of domains and the external criterion of SOs' 
perceptions of the survivors' functional abilities (Survivor AQ – SO-rated AQ). 
Discrepancy scores of this nature are a widely-used, traditional approach of quantifying 
awareness of deficit among populations with cognitive impairment such as TBI 
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(Prigatano, Altman, & O’Brien, 1990; Prigatano & Fordyce, 1986) and MS (Sherman, 
Rapport, & Ryan, 2007; Ryan et al., 2009)  Positive scores indicate that survivors rated 
themselves as more functionally able than did their SOs (i.e., unawareness of deficit). 
Negative scores indicate that survivors underrated their functional abilities as compared 
to significant other perceptions of the survivors’ abilities (i.e., hypervigilance or 
hyperawareness). Scores approaching zero indicate convergence between survivor 
self-perceptions and perceptions of them by SOs (awareness). In the present study, 
reliability (coefficient alpha) for the AQ Difference score was .85. 
On-road Driving Evaluation.  All 62 survivors and 40 healthy controls completed a 
behind-the-wheel evaluation lasting 1-2 hours with a certified occupational 
therapist/driving instructor. The instructor rated the participants on their driving abilities 
in predriving behavior (e.g., seatbelt, check mirrors) and driving behavior in parking lots 
and on roadways, with items scored on a 0 to 2 scale. This comprehensive evaluation 
also included assessments of the participants’ vision and upper and lower extremity 
motor coordination. The driving evaluator also assigned a recommended classification 
to the evaluation. Recommendations included an unrestricted return to independent 
driving as well as restrictions on driving, such as a specific restricted mileage radius 
from home, exclusion of rush-hour traffic, or exclusion of expressways, as well as steps 
for remediation required to return to independent driving, such as satisfactory 
completion of a specific number of remedial training hours with a certified instructor. For 
the purposes of this study, “pass” was considered as cases in which there were no 
restrictions on driving (i.e., recommendation was “return to independent driving”) but 
included a full return with adaptive devices.  
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Neuropsychological Functioning. Neuropsychological functioning of a variety of 
cognitive domains was assessed at the time of survey completion. Healthy controls 
completed the neuropsychological testing at either the time of survey completion or at 
the time of their on-road evaluations. Neuropsychological tests included the Trail 
Making Tests – A & B, Symbol Digit Modalities Test, Judgment of Line Orientation, 
Stroop Test, Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test, and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale- III Letter Number Sequencing and Matrix Reasoning subtests. The MMSE was 
also administered to the participants in the control group as part of exclusionary criteria. 
For parsimony in multivariate analyses, a composite score was calculated (NP 
Composite) reflecting the average Z score on the tests. 
Trail Making Test Parts A and B (TMT; Reitan & Wolfson, 1988. The TMT is a well-
established and sensitive test of processing speed, visual searching, sequencing, and 
mental flexibility. In the TMT, Part A requires the examinee to draw a line connecting 25 
encircled numbers, which are randomly arranged on a page, in the proper order. For 
Part B, the examinee is required to draw a line connecting 25 encircled numbers and 
letters in alternating order. Both parts are scored separately according to the completion 
time. One year rest-retest reliability coefficients were .69 to .94 for Part A and .66 to .86 
for Part B for various neurological groups (Goldstein & Watson, 1989). The TMT has 
been found to be highly sensitive to brain damage (Leninger, Gramling, & Farrell, 1990; 
O’Donnell, 1983), such as closed-head injury (desRosiers & Kavanagh, 1987) and 
alcoholism (Grant, Reed, & Adams, 1987).  
Symbol Digit Modalities Test – Written Version (SDMT; Smith, 1973). 
The SDMT assesses visual scanning, tracking and processing speed. Examinees are 
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presented with a series of nine geometric symbols in random order, and for each 
symbol in the sequence the examinee must search a key for that symbol and substitute 
a corresponding number. The written version requires examinees to write the numbers 
in the appropriate boxes below the geometric symbols according to the key provided at 
the top of the page. Test-retest reliability has been reported as .80 for the written 
version. In terms of validity, the SDMT has been found to be one of the most sensitive 
measures of reduced speed of processing (Smith, 1991).  
Judgment of Line Orientation (JOLO; Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1978; 
Benton, Varney, & Hamsher, 1978). The JOLO is a 30-item test measuring 
visuoperceptual ability, in which examinees are asked to match pairs of angled stimulus 
lines to two lines of matching orientation from an array of 11 numbered line segments of 
various angular orientations. The test has shown excellent reliability in a variety of 
populations. Split-half reliability among healthy adults ranges from .89 to .94, whereas 
3-week retest reliability has been reported at .90 (Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 
1978).  
Modified Stroop Test (Golden, 1978). The Stroop Test measures selective 
attention, response inhibition, and interference control. The test examines the ease with 
which an examinee can shift perceptual set to conform to changing demands and 
suppress a habitual response in favor of an unusual one. The task requires the 
examinee to first read color words printed in black ink as quickly as they can (Word 
Score), then state the color XXXXs are printed in (Color Score), and finally name the 
color of the ink of words that do not correspond with the color of that ink (Color-Word 
Score). Stroop Color-Word Test is among the most widely used measures of 
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interference control, and it is frequently used in driving evaluation batteries. One-month 
retest reliabilities range from .83 to .90 (Golden, 1978).  
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The Brixton Spatial 
Anticipation Test is a measure of nonverbal problem solving measuring concept 
attainment through rule detection. The task requires the examinee to learn and follow a 
pattern of a blue dot moving in various and changing patterns (e.g., moving forward, 
moving in reverse, moving back and forth, etc.) in a series of ten circles. The examinee 
is to predict where the blue dot will be on the next card, and if they are incorrect, to 
learn from his or her mistake and adjust their guess for the next movement in the 
pattern. This test is scored based on the number of errors committed. Split-half reliability 
for the Brixton was reported as .82 (Burgess & Shallice, 1997).   
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III: Letter Number Sequencing and Matrix 
Reasoning subtests (Wechsler, 1997). WAIS-III Matrix Reasoning assesses visual 
information processing and abstract reasoning skills. It is an untimed, language-free test 
and requires no motor manipulation. Four types of items make up the subtest: 
continuous and discrete completion, classification, analogy reasoning, and serial 
reasoning. WAIS-III Letter-Number Sequencing assesses working memory and 
attention. The task requires the examinee to order sequentially a series of numbers and 
letters that are orally presented.  
Mini Mental Status Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975): The 
MMSE consists of 11 items that assess orientation to time and place, 
attention/concentration, language, constructional ability, and immediate and delayed 
recall. The general purpose of this test is to screen for mental impairment and to 
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document intellectual changes occurring over time. Test-retest reliability estimates 
generally fall between .80 and .95 (Tombaugh & McIntyre, 1992). The MMSE has been 
found to be sensitive to the presence of dementia, especially moderate to severe forms 
of cognitive impairment (Spreen & Strauss, 1998).  
Procedure 
ABI survivors meeting eligibility qualifications were recruited from the Driving 
Education and Training Center (DETC) at the Rehabilitation Institute of Michigan (RIM) 
while they completed their driving evaluations. Survivors then selected an SO to 
complete the surveys with them (e.g. BDQ-DS, AQ). SOs and members of the 
community without history of acquired brain injury were recruited to participate in the on-
road evaluation and neuropsychological testing. To minimize volunteer bias caused by 
transportation restrictions, ABI survivors were offered the option of completing the 
questionnaire and interview portions of the study at their homes. All participants were 
compensated with a monetary payment for their participation in the study.   
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CHAPTER 3 RESULTS 
Prior to analysis, the data were screened for violations of the assumptions 
associated with univariate and multivariate tests. Variables with non-normal distributions 
that may inflate alpha were transformed to improve normality and linearity (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2006). Results of this evaluation led to the log transformation of on-road driving 
score, which improved normality and reduced the impact of outlying data points and 
skew.  For the purposes of interpretation, the untransformed values are included in 
tables, whereas the transformed variables were used in the statistical analyses as 
appropriate and are noted where applicable.  
Table 1 and 2 display demographic characteristics of the total sample, including 
ABI survivors and the Control group. Survivors and controls did not differ significantly in 
educational level (F(1, 100) = 2.27, p = .135) or age (F(1, 100) = 0.506, p = .479). Age 
and education were unrelated to the on-road total score (Age r = -.01; Education r = .15) 
and pass/fail results (Age eta = -.07; Education eta = .00). There was a significantly 
greater percentage of men in the survivor group (69%) than in the control group (40%), 
X2(1, N = 102) = 8.59, p = .003, phi = -.29; this finding reflects the natural demographic 
of caregivers, who are proportionately more women than men. The AQ was used to 
classify the participants' awareness status by calculating a difference score based on 
the survivors’ and significant others’ responses. The sample was categorized into three 
groups based on the AQ results and the natural distribution of the difference scores. 
Twenty-one participants in the survivor group were classified as having impaired 
awareness (positive AQ Difference scores, range 7 to 24), which corresponded to 
roughly one third of the ABI sample and a natural break in the distribution of the AQ 
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Difference scores, 24 participants were classified as having intact awareness (AQ 
Difference scores near zero, range 0 to 6), and 17 participants were classified as being 
hypervigilant to deficits (negative AQ Difference scores, range -1 to -13). Characteristics 
of the survivors grouped by their level of awareness of deficit are displayed in Table 2 
and 3. 
Hypothesis 1a: Awareness of deficits is directly related to fitness to drive.  
Hypotheses 1a predicted that ABI survivors who had awareness of their deficits 
would have more success on the on-road evaluation than would their counterparts with 
impaired awareness. Awareness of deficits was significantly correlated with on-road 
driving performance (r = -.28, p = .015) and evaluation recommendations (eta = -.24, p 
= .032); the direction of association indicates that impaired awareness was adversely 
associated with driving outcome. In the Impaired Awareness group, their level of 
awareness of deficits was strongly correlated with both on-road driving performance and 
evaluation recommendations; in contrast, among the Hypervigilant and Intact 
Awareness groups, awareness of deficits was not significantly and weakly related to 
driving outcomes (see Table 4). 
Group differences between survivors designated as Hypervigilant, Intact 
Awareness, and with Impaired Awareness, and the Control group on the on-road 
evaluation were assessed using analysis of variance (ANOVA). There was a significant 
difference between the groups on their (log of) on-road driving performance: F(3, 97) = 
6.00, p = .001, partial η2 = .16. However, Levene’s test indicated heterogeneity of 
variance, F(3, 97) = 26.54, p < .001. Therefore, Levene’s corrections were adopted as 
appropriate in comparing the groups using independent t tests. Hedges’ g (Hedges, 
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1981), was selected as the estimate of effect size, because it represents the sample 
statistic parallel to Cohen’s d (i.e., g is the bias-corrected estimate of the population 
effect size d), which adjusts for cell sizes and pooled standard deviation. Hedges’ g is 
interpreted similar to Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1965), with .20 indicating a small but non-trivial 
effect, .50 indicating a medium effect, and .80 or larger indicating a large effect. 
Independent t tests conducted on (log of) on-road driving performance indicated that the 
Intact Awareness group (M = 0.86, SD = 0.18) performed significantly worse than did 
the Controls (M = 0.92, SD = 0.02), t(22.4) = 1.76, p = .047; Hedges’ g for the group 
difference was .59, indicating a medium effect. Similarly, the Hypervigilant group (M = 
0.83, SD = 0.16) performed worse than the Controls did, t(16.3) = 2.37, p = .015, with g 
= 1.03, a large effect. The Impaired Awareness group (M = 0.75, SD = 0.24) showed the 
greatest difference from the control group, t(20.2) = 3.31, p = .002, g = 1.22, large. The 
group with intact awareness did not differ significantly from the Hypervigilant group, 
t(36.8) = 0.46, p = .322. g = .14, small, but showed a strong trend toward superior 
performance over the Impaired Awareness group, t(37.2) = -1.65, p = .054, g = 0.50, 
medium. The Hypervigilant and Impaired Awareness groups did not differ significantly, 
t(34.8) = -1.25, p = .110, g = 0.38, a small effect.  
A chi-square test indicated that the four groups differed in the proportion of 
participants who passed versus failed the on-road evaluation, X2(3, N = 102) = 22.02, p 
< .001, phi = .47 (see Table 2). The pass rate for the Hypervigilant group (64.7%) was 
not different from the pass rate for the Intact Awareness group (58.3%), X2(1, N = 41) = 
0.17, p = .680, phi = -.06, or the pass rate for the Impaired Awareness group (47.6%), 
X2(1, N = 38) = 1.11, p = .292, phi = -.17. Similarly, the pass rate for Impaired 
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Awareness group (47.6%) did not differ from the Intact Awareness group (58.3%), X2(1, 
N = 45) = 0.52, p = .472, phi = -.11. The pass rate for the Control group (97.5%) differed 
significantly from each of the ABI survivor groups, Hypervigilant group, X2(1, N = 57) = 
11.91, p < .001, phi =.46; Intact Awareness group, X2(1, N = 64) = 16.17, p < .001, phi = 
.50, and Impaired Awareness group, X2(1, N = 61) = 21.68, p < .001, phi = .60. In sum, 
the Control group attained better driving outcomes than did the ABI survivor groups, 
with the Impaired Awareness group having driving outcomes the most discrepant from 
the controls. 
Hypothesis 1b: Cognitive and motor/sensory awareness will have greater relation to 
driving performance than will behavioral/affective awareness.  
 Among the total sample of ABI survivors, each domain of awareness was 
significantly correlated with driving performance (AQ – Cognitive, r = -.24, p = .030; AQ 
– Motor/Sensory, r = -.26, p = .022; AQ – Behavioral/Affective, r = -.25, p = .027). 
Correlations were also conducted for each group separately: Among the Hypervigilant 
group and the Intact Awareness group, correlations between awareness domains and 
driving performance were small and not significant (rs .04 to .24). Among the survivors 
with impaired awareness, cognitive and motor/sensory awareness showed moderate 
and significant relationship to driving performance (AQ – Cognitive, r = .42, p = .028; AQ 
– Motor/Sensory, r = .44, p = .023); the correlation between on-road performance and 
behavioral/affective awareness was smaller and not significant (AQ – 
Behavioral/Affective, r = .28, p = .107). Table 4 displays correlations between 
awareness variables and on-road performances for each of the survivor groups, and 
Table 5 displays the correlations for all ABI survivors. 
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Hypothesis 2a: Among ABI survivors, awareness of deficit will moderate the relationship 
between neuropsychological test performance and on-road driving evaluation. 
The moderating effects of awareness of deficit were tested through linear 
multiple regression, specifically examining the interaction of level of awareness and 
neuropsychological test performance on the outcomes of the on-road driving evaluation. 
An interaction term between awareness of deficit (AQ Difference) and the 
neuropsychological composite score was created; the product was centered to minimize 
collinearity between the interaction term and the individual variables used to create it 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Standard multiple regression tested 
the combined and unique predictive powers of the individual variables awareness of 
deficit (AQ-Difference), neuropsychological functioning (NP Composite), and the 
interaction of those two variables (AQ Difference * NP Composite). Table 6 displays 
results of the multiple regression. The overall model was significant, F(3, 58) = 6.50, p = 
.001, R2 = .25. Results showed that the AQ Difference * NP Composite interaction 
explained significant portion of unique variance in the performance on the total score of 
the on-road evaluation (sr2 = .08, p = .05). Thus, awareness of deficit did moderate the 
relationship between neuropsychological test performance and driving performance.   
 The moderation effect is illustrated by examining the different patterns of 
correlations between the three awareness groups (see Table 7). Among drivers who 
were hypervigilant to the possibility of deficits, the neuropsychological composite score 
was not significantly related to on-road outcomes (ps ≥ .10); it showed modest relation 
to on-road total score and weak relation to on-road pass/fail outcomes. Among survivors 
aware of their deficits, neuropsychological composite scores were not related to their 
33 
 
 
on-road total but were related to the pass/fail recommendation. In contrast, among 
drivers with impaired awareness of their deficits, the composite of neuropsychological 
test performance was strongly related to both driving outcomes. Fisher’s r-to-z 
correlation comparisons indicate that the correlation for on-road total and 
neuropsychological composite for drivers with impaired awareness (r = -.56) was 
significantly larger than the correlation for on-road total and neuropsychological 
composite among drivers with intact awareness (r = -.09), Z = -1.68, p = .047; however, 
the difference between correlations for the impaired awareness and hypervigilant (r = -
.37) groups was not significant, Z = 0.68, p = .25.  
Table 7 also displays correlations for the individual neuropsychological tests with 
the driving outcomes. Among these tests, the TMT-A and SDMT showed the strongest 
correlations with driving outcomes among the ABI survivor groups. Measures of 
executive functioning and visuospatial reasoning were also significantly and moderately 
to strongly correlated with driving outcomes among the Impaired Awareness survivors, 
but these measures showed relatively weaker and nonsignificant correlations in the 
Hypervigilant and Intact Awareness groups.   
There was a significant difference between the ABI survivor groups on their 
neuropsychological composite scores: F(3, 92) = 13.66, p < .001, partial η2 = .31. 
However, Levene’s test indicated heterogeneity of variance, F(3, 92) = 5.01, p = .003. 
Therefore, Levene’s corrections were adopted as appropriate in comparing the groups. 
Independent t tests with Levene’s corrections indicated that the Impaired Awareness 
group (M = -0.64, SD = 0.76) performed significantly worse than did the group with 
intact awareness (M = -0.07, SD = 0.91), t(40.0) = 2.20, p = .017, g = 0.66, medium. 
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The Hypervigilant group (M = -0.36, SD = 0.44) did not differ significantly from the 
Impaired Awareness group, t(29.6) = 1.34, p = .096, g = 0.43, small, or the Intact 
Awareness group, t(33.6) = -1.29, p = .103, g = 0.38, small.  
Hypothesis 2b: Awareness moderates fitness to drive via invoking compensatory 
behaviors. 
It was predicted that use of compensatory strategies would be related to 
successful on-road driving performance and would be more prevalent in the survivors 
with awareness of their deficits than in those with impaired awareness. Among the 62 
ABI survivors, 39 (62.9%) reported that they were driving at the time of their 
participation in the study: Hypervigilant (n = 13), Intact Awareness (n =16), and Impaired 
Awareness (n = 10). Fewer than half of the participants in the Impaired Awareness 
group (47.6%) were driving at the time of their participation as compared to two thirds 
(66.7%) of the Intact Awareness group and three quarters (76.5%) of the Hypervigilant 
group; however, chi-square test indicated that the three groups did not differ 
significantly in the proportion of drivers versus non-drivers, Χ2(2, N = 62) = 3.59, p = .17, 
phi = .40 (medium). 
 Differences between the Hypervigilant, Intact Awareness, and Impaired 
Awareness, and the Control groups in the use of limitations on driving was assessed 
using ANOVA. There was a significant difference between the groups: F(3, 75) = 5.19, p 
= .003, partial η2 = .17. Levene’s test indicated heterogeneity of variance, F(3, 75) = 
6.63, p < .001. As such, Levene’s corrections were adopted as appropriate in comparing 
the groups. Independent t tests with Levene’s corrections revealed that the Control 
group (M = 1.9, SD = 1.9) imposed significantly fewer limitations on their driving than did 
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the Hypervigilant group (M = 4.7, SD = 3.7; t(14.2) = 2.66, p = .009, g = 1.08, large), the 
Impaired Awareness group (M = 4.5, SD = 3.6; t(10.3) = 2.23, p = .023, g = 0.99, large), 
and the Intact Awareness group (M = 3.7, SD = 3.2; t(19.5) = 2.15, p = .023, g = 0.72, 
medium). There were no significant differences in use of limitations among the ABI 
survivors (ps >.22, g < 0.3) (see Table 2).  
Among the Control group (r = -.02) and the participants in the Intact Awareness 
group who were driving at time of their participation in the study (r = .09), use of 
limitations was unrelated to driving performance. Among the Hypervigilant group 
drivers, there was a modest but not significant relationship between use of limitations 
and driving performance (r = -.31, p = .15), and among ABI survivors with impaired 
awareness who had resumed driving, there was a strong relationship between use of 
limitations and on-road performance (r = -.71, p = .012), such that as use of limitations 
increased, driving scores decreased (see Table 8).  
Hypothesis 3: SOs will be better predictors of on-road performance for survivors with 
impaired awareness of their deficits than will the survivors themselves. Among survivors 
with awareness of their deficits, SOs and survivors will show equivalent prediction of 
survivors' on-road performance.  
 Of note, 67.2% of the ABI participants rated themselves as “better than 
average” or “excellent” drivers, with 29.0% rating themselves as average, and 3.2% as 
below average or poor. SOs rated 17.4% of the survivors as below average or poor 
drivers, 37.0% as average, and 45.6% as better than average. Among the Impaired 
Awareness group, 85.7% rated themselves as “better than average” or “excellent” 
drivers, 14.3% as average, and 0% rated themselves as below average or poor. Among 
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the Intact Awareness group, 73.9% rated themselves as “better than average” or 
“excellent” drivers, 21.7% as average, and 4.3% rated themselves as below average or 
poor. Among the Hypervigilant group, 35.3% rated themselves as “better than average” 
or “excellent” drivers, 58.8% as average, and 5.9% rated themselves as below average 
or poor. 
Differences between the ABI survivor groups and the control group on self-rated 
driving abilities (as compared the average driver) were assessed using ANOVA (see 
Table 2). There was a significant difference between the groups: F(3, 97) = 5.03, p = 
.003, partial η2 = .14. Levene’s test indicated heterogeneity of variance, F(3, 97) = 3.60, 
p = .016. Therefore, Levene’s corrections were adopted as appropriate in comparing the 
groups. Independent t tests with Levene’s corrections revealed that the group with 
impaired awareness (M = 4.2, SD = 0.7) rated their driving abilities significantly better 
than did the Hypervigilant group (M = 3.4, SD = 0.7; t(31.7) = -3.20, p = .002, g = 1.12, 
large) and the group with intact awareness (M = 3.8, SD = 0.9; t(41.3) = -1.76, p = .043, 
g = 0.48, small) and not significantly differently than did the Control group (M = 4.1, SD 
= 0.5; t(31.8) = 0.83, p = .410, g = 0.17). The Control group had self-ratings higher than 
the Hypervigilant group, t(21.7) = -3.06, p = .003, g = 1.22, large. The self-ratings of the 
group with intact awareness were not significantly different than those of the 
Hypervigilant group, t(31.1) = -1.42, p = .083, g = 0.48, small, nor the Control group, 
t(31.7) = -1.38, p = .090, g = 0.44, small.   
On average (Table 3), SOs rated participants with impaired awareness as below 
average in driving ability (M = 2.9), whereas the average ratings for the intact and 
hypervigilant participants were above average. Differences between SO-rated driving 
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abilities among the ABI survivor groups were assessed using ANOVA (see Table 3). 
The differences between the groups were not significant, F(2, 43) = 1.45, p = .245, 
partial η2 = .06. SOs’ ratings of the survivors’ driving ability as compared to the average 
driver were not significantly correlated to the survivors’ personal ratings of their driving 
ability nor to the survivors’ on-road performance in the total ABI sample (rs = .16 to .19), 
as can be seen in Table 5. The correlations between SOs’ ratings and survivors’ self-
ratings of driving ability were weak among the Intact Awareness group (r = .20, p = 
.217) and the Impaired Awareness group (r = .22, p = .202) and modest but not 
significant among the Hypervigilant group (r = .36, p = .115). As shown in Table 8, 
among the Hypervigilant group, the SOs’ ratings were strongly correlated (r = .60) and 
the survivors’ self-ratings were modestly related (r = .36) with on-road performance. 
Both the SOs’ (r = .55) and survivors’ ratings (r = .51) were strongly related to the 
survivors’ on-road performance in the Intact Awareness group. In contrast, neither the 
SOs’ nor the self-ratings of the Impaired Awareness group were related to on-road 
performance (rs = .01 to .03). The SOs’ ratings were, however, significantly correlated 
to the Impaired Awareness group survivors’ use of limitations in their driving, such that 
as their ratings decreased, limitations on driving increased (r = -.81, p = .014), whereas 
the Impaired Awareness group survivors’ self-ratings of their driving ability were 
unrelated to their reported driving limitations (r = .00, p = .500). The correlations 
between SOs’ ratings of survivor driving ability and the survivors’ use of limitations were 
weaker among survivors with intact awareness (r = -.24, p = .231), whose self-ratings 
also were relatively unrelated to number of limitations on driving (r = .15, p = .286). 
Among those hypervigilant to their deficits, self-ratings of current driving ability (r = -.57, 
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p = .022) were more strongly correlated with number of driving limitations than were 
SOs’ ratings of the survivors’ driving (r = -.34, p = .171). Neither the SOs’ nor the 
survivors’ ratings of driving abilities were related to the survivors’ neuropsychological 
composite score (see Table 5).  
Hypothesis 4: The control group will perform satisfactorily on the on-road driving 
evaluation and superior to the survivor group. Among the controls, neuropsychological 
performance will not be related to on-road performance.  
ANOVA was used to examine differences between the control group and the ABI 
survivors on the on-road evaluation. The Control group (M = 0.92, SD = 0.02) performed 
significantly better than the ABI survivors (M = 0.81, SD = 0.20) on the on-road 
evaluation: F(1, 99) = 12.01, p = .001, partial η2 = .11. Chi-square test indicated that the 
control group (97.5%) and ABI survivors (56.5%) differed in the proportion of 
participants who passed versus failed the on-road evaluation, X2(1, N = 102) = 20.57, p 
< .001, phi = .45. As noted in Hypothesis 1a, the controls performed better than each of 
the three awareness groups on the on-road evaluation and the pass/fail rates. The 
Control group (M = 0.42, SD = 0.40) also obtained significantly better 
neuropsychological composite scores than did the ABI survivors (M = -0.33, SD = 0.79): 
F(1, 94) = 30.69, p < .001, partial η2 = .25. Correlational analyses showed that among 
the controls, the neuropsychological composite score was correlated to on-road 
performance (r = .37, p = .010) but not to the pass/fail recommendation (r = .16, p = 
.163). Specifically, visuospatial attention and processing speed tests showed the 
strongest associations with driving outcomes, whereas executive functioning measures 
were not as significantly related (see Table 7).  
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CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION 
The findings indicate that awareness of deficit has a considerable influence on 
driving outcomes both directly and as a moderator between the relationship of 
neuropsychological functioning and driving performance. Adults with ABI who had 
awareness of their deficits had more success on the on-road driving evaluation than did 
their counterparts with impaired awareness, and they more accurately assessed their 
own fitness to drive. Furthermore, the findings indicate that awareness of deficits 
moderates the adverse influence of neuropsychological dysfunction on fitness to drive:  
Among adults with impaired awareness of their deficits, cognitive functioning was 
substantially related to their driving outcomes; in contrast, driving outcome showed 
weak relation to cognitive functioning among adults with ABI hypervigilant to or 
adequately aware of their impairments. More than half of the adults with ABI 
successfully passed the on-road driving evaluation. This finding highlights the potential 
for safe driving following ABI despite potential cognitive and physical impairment and is 
consistent with prior research (Schultheis, et al., 2002; van Zomeren, Brouwer & 
Minderhoud, 1987). This study also addressed an important methodological question 
regarding whether expectations for success in an on-road evaluation are reasonable for 
the average driver; in the present study healthy controls had a markedly higher pass 
rate and outperformed the adults with ABI in their on-road evaluations.  
Awareness of Deficits and On-road Performance 
 Driving is a complex task that requires integration of cognitive and physical 
components for safe and successful navigation (Lister, 1999; Lundqvist & Ronnberg, 
2001; Marshall et al., 2007). Awareness of deficit following ABI is integral to this 
40 
 
 
process. As predicted, awareness of deficits was modestly associated with driving 
outcomes, meaning that as awareness of impairments increased, driving outcomes 
improved. As compared to a healthy driver, the adverse effect of having ABI with 
impaired awareness of deficits was large, whereas the adverse effect of ABI with intact 
awareness of deficits was moderate. As compared to adults with ABI who had intact 
awareness of their deficits, the adverse effect of impaired awareness on driving was 
moderate. Of special note, among those with impaired awareness of their deficits, level 
of awareness was strongly associated with their driving performances, such that as their 
awareness increased, driving performances improved. Thus, what awareness of deficit 
was present among this group was of utmost importance to their success on the road. 
Also of interest, participants who were hypervigilant to their deficits (i.e., overrated their 
impairments) had substantially less success than controls, also showing a large effect, 
albeit less large than adults with impaired awareness. Perhaps a bit surprising, although 
they were generally better than adults with impaired awareness in driving and 
neuropsychological functioning, they consistently appeared worse than those with intact 
awareness. In contrast to the adults with impaired awareness of deficits, adults 
hypervigilant to their deficits were attentive to and apparently accurate about their 
deficits and the related effects on their driving abilities. This observation may well 
explain why they passed the evaluation with higher rates despite the deficits they 
realistically maintained.    
The predictive power of neuropsychological tests to on-road driving performance 
has been variable, with some studies showing strong relationships (e.g., Coleman et al, 
2002, Heikkilä, et al., 1999, Ryan et al., 2009, Schanke & Sundet, 2000, etc.) and 
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others showing no relationship (e.g., Bieliauskas, et al., 1998, Withaar, Brouwer, & Van 
Zomeren, 2000). One explanation for this is the possibility of a moderator, such as 
awareness of deficits. As expected, awareness of deficit did moderate this relationship. 
In the present study, global neuropsychological functioning showed modest to strong 
prediction of on-road performance, as did awareness of deficits specifically; however, 
neuropsychological impairments had proportionately more adverse influence under 
conditions in which adults had impaired awareness of their deficits. Among adults with 
impaired awareness of their deficits, neuropsychological performance was strongly 
related to driving performance; in contrast, this relationship was small or null among 
adults hypervigilant to their deficits and those with intact awareness. This finding 
indicates that when adults with ABI lack appreciation for their impairments, their 
neuropsychological status is especially important in predicting driving outcomes. Even 
minor deficits, if not heeded and compensated for appropriately, can increase driving 
risk substantially (Rapport et al., 1993; Ryan et al. 2009). Neuropsychological functions 
involving psychomotor and visuomotor processing speed predicted driving skills among 
all participants, including the healthy controls (e.g., Anstey, Windsor, Luszcz, & 
Andrews, 2006; Edwards et al., 2009; Korteling & Kaptein, 1996). Executive functioning 
and visuospatial reasoning, however, played additional substantial roles in driving 
performance among adults with impaired awareness of their deficits. Adults with 
impaired awareness of deficit demonstrated worse neuropsychological functioning than 
did adults with intact awareness, which is consistent with the finding that persons with 
awareness problems often display global cognitive deficits (Prigatano, 2005); however, 
in the present study, the combined effects of impaired awareness and 
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neuropsychological impairment accounted for unique information in predicting on-road 
evaluation outcome.  
 It was predicted that awareness of cognitive and physical deficits would be 
more related to driving performance than would behavioral and affective awareness. 
Although this finding was not supported in the ABI survivor groups as a whole, among 
adults with impaired awareness, awareness of cognitive and motor and sensory 
impairments was more strongly related to driving performance than was behavioral and 
affective awareness. Among adults with impaired awareness, what awareness they do 
have for their deficits is critical for their driving safety, especially their assessment of 
their cognitive deficits (e.g., impaired processing speed, attention, etc.) and physical 
deficits (e.g., hemiplegia, visual neglect, reduced coordination, etc.). This finding 
indicates that awareness of deficits in cognitive and physical abilities plays a more 
considerable role in safe driving than does awareness of emotional deficits (e.g., 
increased mood lability, decreased control over emotional responses, etc.), likely 
because physical and cognitive health are of greater necessity in driving safety than is 
emotional health.   
Compensatory Strategies 
As compared to healthy drivers, adults with ABI who had resumed driving with 
impaired awareness of their deficits and those hypervigilant towards their deficits 
reported substantially more limitations imposed on their driving; for adults with intact 
awareness of their deficits, limitations on driving were moderate as compared to their 
healthy counterparts. Contrary to prediction and previous research (e.g., Lundqvist & 
Alinder, 2007; Rapport, Coleman Bryer, & Hanks, 2008; Ryan, et al., 2009), being 
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aware of deficits was not associated with increased use of compensatory strategies, 
such as reducing nighttime driving or avoiding highways. Those with intact awareness 
of their deficits did not report greater use of limitations than did those with impaired 
awareness. Healthy controls implemented fewer limitations than did adults with ABI, as 
would be expected given they should not need to limit their driving in any way or 
compensate for an impairment. Unexpectedly, though, reported limitations were strongly 
related to worse driving performance among adults with impaired awareness and 
modestly related to worse driving performance among those hypervigilant to their 
deficits. This finding could be explained by the possibility that, especially in the case of 
survivors unaware of their deficits, the limitations are being imposed upon the survivor 
by a significant other or driving evaluator, who determines them to be necessary. Prior 
research has found that the caregivers “hold the keys to the car,” in that they have the 
most influence on whether and how much adults with ABI drive (Coleman et al., 2002; 
Rapport et al., 2006; Rapport et al., 2008; Scott et al., 2009). Thus, adults with ABI who 
are perceived to have more impairments that may adversely affect their driving abilities 
may actually be reporting more limitations on their driving because they are either 
required to by doctors or driving professionals or because their significant other 
enforces certain driving limitations. Therefore, the measure of compensatory strategies 
in the present study may not have tapped self-imposed compensation or driving 
limitations, but also other-imposed driving restrictions. It is not known if these adults with 
ABI were in fact invoking these self-reported limitations when they were driving 
independently and if so, how successfully they were able to do so. Furthermore, the 
relationship between increased use of limitations and poorer driving performance may 
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be a reflection of a third variable, impairment level. Persons with greater impairments 
require more driving limitations and restrictions, which is related to their poorer driving 
performance.  
There was not a direct relationship between use of limitations and driving 
performance among the adults with intact awareness or the healthy controls. It is likely 
that the healthy controls did not need compensations measured as limitations on 
driving. This explanation might apply as well to adults with intact awareness, although it 
is unlikely, because they showed meaningful neuropsychologic impairment relative to 
the healthy adults and did have impairments that needed some compensatory 
response. It might be these adults with intact awareness used more subtle 
compensations that are more difficult to self-report (e.g., allowing more time and 
distance to pull out or turn, more visual scanning, greater distance in following, etc.). It 
is also possible that these and other compensations adopted by drivers aware of their 
deficits were effective, and that quality rather than quantity of self-imposed limitations 
(i.e., selectively and effectively invoked) makes for a nonlinear relationship between 
compensation and driving performance. It is important to note, however, that 
observations regarding limitations on driving applied only to the small subset of 
individuals who were driving at the time of their participation; this cluster of individuals 
represents a selected group that likely differs from adults who were not driving.  
Self-assessment and Predictions of Driving Performance 
 Awareness of deficits is also related to how one perceives one’s ability to drive 
safely. Interestingly, adults with impaired awareness viewed themselves as better 
drivers than did those with intact awareness or hypervigilant to deficits. In fact, the 
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survivors with impaired awareness did not view themselves differently than did the 
healthy adults. As predicted, the self-evaluations of driving ability of the adults with 
impaired awareness of deficits were not related to their on-road performance. As such, 
they overestimated their driving abilities, lacking a full appreciation for the effects of their 
impairments on this complex task. This finding provides empirical support for the many 
theoretical propositions regarding the importance of accurate self-assessment in fitness 
to drive. It is fairly consistent with the conclusions and theories of Lundqvist and Alinder 
(2007) who speculated that those who fail on-road evaluations are less aware of their 
abilities and are more likely to overestimate their abilities. Similarly, Scott, Rapport, 
Coleman-Bryer, Griffen, Hanks and McKay (2009) also found that stroke survivors 
overestimated their driving abilities as compared to the average driver. They discuss 
their results within the context of Groeger and Grande’s (1996) theory of a “driving self,” 
which is a stable trait like other aspects of self-concept, such that it is entrenched over 
time and resistant to change. Groeger and Grande argue that under most 
circumstances, drivers’ views of their driving abilities are unlikely to adjust, especially in 
the case of experienced drivers. In the present study, this ability to appropriately adjust 
self-ratings of one’s driving abilities is lacking among the adults with impaired 
awareness. Most adults believe that they are better than average drivers; in most 
circumstances, this is a benign inaccuracy, because a broad range around average is 
sufficient for competent, safe driving. However, in the absence of a shift in self-
assessment following ABI, drivers with impairments cannot make concomitant shifts in 
driving behaviors necessary to compensate. Even small impairments that go without 
adjustment pose serious risk on the road.  
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As expected, the adults with awareness of or hypervigilance towards their deficits 
were better at predicting their driving performances than were those with impaired 
awareness. This finding suggests that perceptions of personal driving abilities are more 
accurate among those with greater awareness of their other abilities (e.g., cognitive, 
motor/sensory, and behavioral/affective). Thus, these adults appear to be more able to 
adjust their sense of a “driving self” appropriately and accordingly to their history of ABI 
and resulting deficits, in contrast to those with impaired awareness of their deficits 
(Groeger & Grande, 1996).  
The significant others’ perceptions of the driving abilities of adults with intact 
awareness of or hypervigilance towards deficits were also strongly associated with the 
survivors’ driving performance. In fact, among survivors hypervigilant towards deficits, 
SOs were better predictors of the driving abilities than were the survivors themselves. 
Surprisingly, the significant others’ perceptions of the impaired awareness survivors’ 
driving abilities were as unrelated to the survivors’ driving outcomes as were the 
survivors’ self-perceptions. There was a trend with a medium-sized effect toward SOs 
viewing the survivors with impaired awareness worse than the other survivors. 
Interestingly, neither the survivors’ self-perceptions of their driving abilities nor the SOs’ 
perceptions of them were related to neuropsychological functioning. These findings 
suggest the SOs’ perceptions of the survivors are not consistently related to actual 
fitness to drive, as found similarly by Coleman et al. (2002), especially among survivors 
with impaired awareness. This is an important observation because most adults do not 
seek a driver evaluation, even as they age or otherwise change, including acquired 
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brain impairment; they and their families simply assess themselves (Fisk, Schneider, & 
Novack, 1998).  
 The SOs’ perceptions were substantially related to use of limitations among 
adults with impaired awareness of their deficits, such that the poorer the perceptions 
were the more limitations the survivor reported using in their driving. In contrast, the 
self-perceptions of the adults with impaired awareness were not related to use of 
limitations. This finding likely again reflects the SOs’ involvement in restricting the 
driving of survivors with perceived awareness problems or significant impairments, such 
that they “hold the keys to the car” (Coleman et al., 2002; Rapport et al., 2006; Rapport 
et al., 2008; Scott et al., 2009). This further supports the notion that SOs determine 
whether and to what extent an adult drives following ABI, despite the survivors’ self-
perceptions and actual level of functioning. This relationship between the SOs’ 
perceptions and use of limitations was much weaker among adults with intact 
awareness or hypervigilance to their deficits as compared to those with impaired 
awareness. In fact, the self-perceptions of adults hypervigilant to their deficits were 
strongly related to their use of limitations, whereas the perceptions of the SOs were 
modestly related to use of limitations. This finding suggests that the adults hypervigilant 
to their deficits may be more active in decision making regarding driving and setting 
restrictions than are the adults with impaired awareness of their deficits whose SOs may 
“hold the keys.”  
Healthy Controls and Driving Performance 
 Healthy controls were included in this on-road driving evaluation study to allow 
comparisons between healthy adults and those with histories of ABI. Consistent with 
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expectations, the healthy controls were highly successful in their on-road driving 
performances and achieved higher scores and passing rates than did the adults with 
ABI as an entire group and each awareness subgroup of survivors. This finding 
indicates that passing an on-road evaluation is within reasonable expectations and not 
unduly difficult.  
 Contrary to prediction, neuropsychological performance was moderately 
associated with driving outcomes among the healthy adults. This finding indicates that 
even among healthy adults those with better neuropsychological functioning attained 
better driving scores as compared to those with relatively lower neuropsychological 
functioning. Specifically, it appears that psychomotor and visuomotor processing speed 
are important to good driving among healthy adults and adults with ABI alike. Quick 
information processing and reaction time are essential for safe driving, and this finding 
suggests that more is better. Even among healthy adults, those with faster processing 
speed and response times were better drivers, albeit the healthy adults had a nearly 
100% success rate in passing an on-road evaluation; therefore, although some 
gradations of skills can be perceived among competent drivers, there is a threshold 
effect for adequate driving. In contrast to psychomotor and visuomotor processing 
speed, executive functioning was not as strongly related to driving outcomes among 
healthy adults and adults with intact awareness or hypervigilance towards their deficits. 
Among adults with impaired awareness of their deficits, however, executive functioning 
and visuospatial reasoning were also strongly associated with driving outcomes. This 
result is consistent with the discussion that what awareness, or in this case cognitive 
reasoning, these survivors have is of utmost importance to driving safety. This finding 
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also suggests that safe driving requires a basic or average level of reasoning ability, but 
that once that threshold is attained, superior reasoning abilities do not strongly affect 
driving abilities; yet, if this minimum level is not attained driving performance suffers.  
Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research 
Being aware of deficits that may interfere with safe driving is critical for adults 
with acquired brain impairments. If deficits are not adequately appreciated and the 
driving self-concept not appropriately adjusted, survivors overestimate their driving 
abilities. This overestimation may lead to a decision to resume driving prematurely, 
resistance to following driving restrictions, failure to engage self-imposed compensatory 
strategies, and engaging in risky driving behaviors. Neuropsychological and on-road 
evaluations are the typical methods for assessing fitness to drive. This study highlights 
the importance of also assessing the survivors’ level of awareness of their deficits, 
especially those cognitive and physical in nature. The predictive value of 
neuropsychological assessment is of particular importance among adults with impaired 
awareness of their deficits.  
Limitations to this study include the mixed nature of the sample, composed of a 
variety of neurological conditions and injuries. Although the focus of the study was on 
awareness of deficit and driving, not a particular illness or injury, it may be helpful to 
further examine these relationships within the context of one specific group in which 
disease characteristics are more homogenous (e.g., prognosis, specific symptoms, 
etc.). Additionally, the mixed nature of this sample made assessing and controlling for 
noncognitive severity of illness or injury difficult. The inclusion of healthy controls to an 
on-road research design is an improvement to the current body of literature; however, 
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the design of the study did not allow for blind on-road evaluations. It is possible that 
ratings by the driving expert were affected by knowing to which group the participant 
belonged; yet it is noteworthy that one of the healthy adults did not pass the evaluation. 
The study included a variety of exploratory analyses in which subgroups were examined 
(e.g., among current drivers and their use of driving limitations) with small cell sizes and 
limited statistical power for significance tests. Replication of these findings in a larger 
sample is warranted. It should also be noted that these findings apply to adults with ABI 
who sought out or were referred by physicians for a driving evaluation and followed up 
in doing so to assess their fitness to drive, and thus, these results are not representative 
of all adults with ABI. As mentioned previously, a majority of adults with ABI do not 
receive an on-road evaluation, and driving safety is not adequately addressed in the 
healthcare system (Fisk, Schneider, & Novack, 1998). Additionally, state laws vary 
widely regarding the roles, expectations, and liabilities involved for healthcare workers 
to report driving safety issues and refer their patients for evaluations.  
The present findings contribute to a limited body of research investigating 
awareness of deficits in the context of an on-road driving evaluation with both a clinical 
sample and healthy adults. As awareness of deficit has not traditionally been included in 
clinical driving evaluations or even research examining predictors of driving following 
acquired brain impairment, this study is informative about the benefits of considering 
self-awareness in understanding the relationship between neuropsychological test 
performance and driving performance. Future studies could further examine the use of 
compensatory strategies following acquired brain impairment, including differences 
between self- and other-initiated strategies and who encourages and chooses these 
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alternative or limited driving behaviors. The role of the caregiver or significant other 
appears to be especially important in understanding use of compensatory strategies in 
survivors with impaired awareness of deficits. Future research would also be helpful in 
examining the relationship between awareness of deficit and driving by assessing other 
driving outcomes, such as driving records and performance on driving simulator tasks. 
A longitudinal study following adults with acquired brain impairment and assessing 
relationships between and changes in self-awareness, neuropsychological functioning, 
decision-making regarding driving, and long-term driving outcomes would be ideal and 
especially informative. These studies could add further evidence as to the important role 
of awareness of deficits as a moderator between neuropsychological status and driving 
ability.  
 
52 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Demographics of Participants with Acquired Brain Injury. 
 
Survivors (n = 62) M SD Range 
Age (years) 49.5 14.1 19 – 81 
Education (years) 13.9 2.4 11 – 20 
Time since onset of ABI (months) 30.31 63.1 2 – 364 
Percent Men 69.4   
Diagnosis (%)    
 Stroke 50.0   
 Traumatic Brain Injury 17.7   
 Multiple sclerosis 12.9   
 Tumor 6.5   
 Other 12.9   
Percent driving2  62.9   
 
1. Median = 12 months 
2. Percent of survivors driving at the time of study. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Characteristics of Survivors Grouped by Level of Awareness of 
Deficits: Hypervigilant (n = 17), Intact Awareness (n = 24), Impaired Awareness (n = 21), and 
Control (n = 40).  
 Group 
 Hypervigilant Intact       Awareness 
Impaired  
Awareness Control 
Variables M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Age  49.6 12.0 49.5 14.5 49.5 15.9 47.5 13.7 
Education  13.8 2.2 13.8 2.5 14.0 2.6 14.6 2.3 
NP Composite -0.36 0.44 -0.07 0.91 -0.64 0.76 0.42 0.40 
         
Percent Driving1 76.5  66.7  47.6  100.0  
Self-Limitations 4.7 3.7 3.7 3.2 4.5 3.6 1.9 1.9 
Self-rated driving skill 3.4 0.7 3.8 0.9 4.2 0.7 4.1 0.5 
 
        
On-road Total 1.9 0.1 1.9 0.1 1.9 0.2 2.0 0.0 
Percent On-road Pass 64.7  58.3  47.6  97.5  
 
        
 
1. Percent of participants driving at the time of study. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Characteristics of Survivors Grouped by Level of Awareness of 
Deficits: Hypervigilant (n = 17), Intact Awareness (n = 24) and Impaired Awareness (n = 21).  
 Group 
 Hypervigilant Intact       Awareness 
Impaired  
Awareness 
Variables M SD M SD M SD 
       
AQ Total (Survivor) 25.4 6.7 28.7 5.2 31.2 6.1 
AQ Cognitive (Survivor) 1.5 0.5 1.7 0.4 1.8 0.4 
AQ Beh/Aff (Survivor) 1.5 0.5 1.8 0.4 2.0 0.6 
AQ Motor/Sen (Survivor) 1.4 0.3 1.5 0.4 1.7 0.4 
       
AQ Total (SO) 29.7 4.6 26.9 5.0 18.0 5.6 
AQ Cognitive (SO) 1.6 0.4 1.6 0.4 1.0 0.4 
AQ Beh/Aff (SO) 2.1 0.4 1.7 0.3 1.2 0.5 
AQ Motor/Sen (SO) 1.5 0.4 1.5 0.4 1.1 0.4 
       
Self-rated driving skill 3.4 0.7 3.8 0.9 4.2 0.7 
SO-rated driving skill 3.3 0.9 3.6 1.0 2.9 1.3 
 
Note.  AQ = Awareness Questionnaire, Survivor self-report, and Significant Other (SO) report on the 
survivor; Beh/Aff = Behavioral/Affective; Sen = Sensory. 
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Table 4. Pearson Correlations: Awareness of Deficits with On-road Outcomes among ABI 
Survivors. 
 Group 
 
Hypervigilant 
(n = 17) 
Intact     
Awareness 
(n = 24) 
Impaired  
Awareness 
(n = 21) 
Variables On-road     
Total1,2 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome2 
On-road     
Total 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome 
On-road     
Total 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome 
AQ Difference Total .12 -.08 .26 .17 -.49* -.51** 
AQ Difference: Cognitive .15 -.28 .23 .03 -.42* -.41* 
AQ Difference: Beh/Aff -.08 .16 -.04 .25 -.28 -.33† 
AQ Difference: Motor/Sen .10 -.08 .24 -.05 -.44* -.44* 
AQ Total (Survivor) .34† .09 .36* .54** .51** -.22 
AQ Cognitive (Survivor) .18 -.15 .20 .27 .56** -.25 
AQ Beh/Aff (Survivor) .26 .16 .18 .63** .26 -.09 
AQ Motor/Sen (Survivor) .66** .39† .56** .38* .41* -.25 
AQ Total (SO) .45* .19 .27 .49** .03 .30† 
AQ Cognitive (SO) .11 .03 .10 .27 .14 .20 
AQ Beh/Aff (SO) .35† .02 .23 .54** .00 .26 
AQ Motor/Sen (SO) .56* .45* .40* .40* .10 .26 
Note.  AQ = Awareness Questionnaire, Survivor self-report, and Significant Other (SO) report on the 
survivor; Beh/Aff = Behavioral/Affective; Sen = Sensory; Pass/Fail = eta correlations.  
1. Log transformed.       
2. Positive correlation denotes propensity toward pass outcome.     
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
  
 
 
  
Table 5. Pearson Correlations among all ABI Survivors (n = 62).  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. On-road Total1,2  --          
2. Pass/Fail on-road2 .72** --         
3. NP Composite .45** .58** --        
4. AQ Difference Total -.28* -.24* -.24* --       
5. AQ Cognitive Difference -.24* -.26* -.27* .89** --      
6. AQ Behavioral Difference -.25* -.15 -.18 .92** .69** --     
7. AQ Motor Difference -.26* -.26* -.17 .75** .58** .56** --    
8. Self-Limitations3 
-.26* -.33** -.28** -.03 .03 -.16 .19 -- 
 
 
9. Self-rated driving ability .20* .17* .00 .43** .34** .39** .37** -.12 --  
10. SO-rated driving ability .19† .18† -.08 -.23† -.15 -.24† -.20† -.14 .16 -- 
Note.  Pass/Fail = eta correlations.  
1. Log transformed.  
2. Positive correlation denotes propensity toward pass outcome. 
3. Completed only by participants driving at time of study; n = 39. 
†p < .10, p < .05, **p < .01
5
6
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Table 6. Multiple Regression Analysis of Moderation Effect: Interaction between Awareness of 
Deficit and Neuropsychological Performance Predicting (Log of) On-road Driving Performance 
among ABI Survivors.  
 
 
Variables 
 
R2 
 
 
Beta 
 
sr2 
 
 
 
F 
 
df 
 
P 
 
Overall Predictor Model: 
 
 
AQ-Difference  
 
NP Composite  
 
AQ-Difference * NP Composite 
   
  
 
.25 
 
 
 
 
 
-.05 
 
-.29* 
 
-.40* 
 
 
 
 
.00 
 
.08 
 
.08 
 
 
 
6.50 
 
3, 58 
 
.001 
Note. AQ-Difference = Awareness Questionnaire Difference Score (Survivor – SO report on survivor); NP 
Composite = Neuropsychological composite score.  
Note. sr2 (unique) = squared semipartial correlation.  
*p < .05
  
Table 7. Pearson Correlations: Neuropsychological Tests with Driving Outcomes for ABI Survivor Groups and Controls. 
 Group 
 
Control 
n = 40 
Hypervigilant 
n = 17 
Intact Awareness 
n = 24 
Impaired Awareness 
n = 21 
Variables On-road     
Total1,2 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome2 
On-road     
Total 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome 
On-road     
Total 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome 
On-road     
Total 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome 
NP Composite .37** .16 .37† .27 .09 .52** .56** .60** 
TMT A -.41** -.44** -.59* -.40† -.12 -.49** -.29 -.51* 
TMT B -.17 -.16 -.34 -.31 .06 -.39* -.47* -.57** 
Brixton -.12 -.15 .05 .09 .00 -.30† -.48* -.27 
LNS .07 -.19 .18 .05 .05 .40* .67** .51* 
Matrix Reasoning .30* .00 .13 .17 .01 .09 .51* .37† 
SDMT – Written .29* .29* .73** .61* .05 .38* .55** .46* 
JOLO .17 -.13 .18 -.07 .09 .21 .27 .28 
Stroop Word  .17 .15 .21 .27 .43* .66** .13 .04 
Stroop Color  .22† .13 .22 .21 .38† .64** .58* .41† 
Stroop Color Word .23† .15 .39† -.05 .23 .57** .51* .49* 
Note. NP Composite = Neuropsychological Composite score; TMT = Trail Making Test; Brixton = Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test; LNS = Letter 
Number Sequencing; SDMT = Symbol Digit Modality Test; JOLO = Judgment of Line Orientation; Stroop = Stroop Test. Pass/Fail = eta 
correlations.  
1. Log transformed.  
2. Positive correlation denotes propensity toward pass outcome. 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01
5
8
 
 
  
Table 8. Pearson Correlations: Ratings of Driving Ability and Self-Limitations with On-road Outcomes among ABI Survivors and 
Controls. 
 Group 
 Control 
(n = 40) 
Intact Awareness 
(n = 17) 
Impaired Awareness 
(n = 24) 
Hypervigilant 
(n = 21) 
Variables On-road     Total1,2 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome2 
On-road     
Total 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome 
On-road     
Total 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome 
On-road     
Total 
Pass/Fail 
Outcome 
Self-Limitations3 -.02 -.01 .09 -.16 -.70** -.54* -.31 -.20 
Self-rated ability .18 .01 .51** .19 .01 .01 .36† .39† 
SO-rated ability NA NA .55** .09 .03 .43* .60* .25 
Note.  Pass/Fail = eta correlations.  
1. Log transformed. 
2. Positive correlation denotes propensity toward pass outcome. 
3. Completed only by participants driving at time of study; n = 16 Intact, n = 10 Impaired, n = 13 Hypervigilant. 
†p < .10,*p < .05, **p < .01
5
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This study examined the relationship of neuropsychological and on-road driving 
evaluations among adults with acquired brain injury (ABI), and the extent to which that 
relationship is moderated by awareness of deficit. Awareness of deficit may partly 
explain mixed findings regarding the relationship between cognitive function and driving 
outcomes, inasmuch as persons aware of their deficits attempt to compensate for them 
accordingly, thereby minimizing deficit-related risk. 
Sixty-two pairs of adults with ABI and significant-other informants recruited from 
a driving evaluation center and 40 healthy controls participated. Adults with ABI and 
controls completed neuropsychological and on-road evaluations.  
Awareness of deficit was directly related to driving outcomes and was also a 
moderator between the relationship of neuropsychological functioning and driving 
performance. Multiple regression indicated the interaction between neuropsychological 
test performance and awareness of deficits explained significant variance in driving 
performance. The moderation effect was illustrated by different relationships between 
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neuropsychological and on-road performances among the awareness groups: Among 
adults with impaired awareness (n = 21), neuropsychological functioning was 
substantially related to driving outcomes; in contrast, driving outcome showed weak 
relation to neuropsychological functioning among those with intact (n = 24) or 
hypervigilance (n = 17) toward their deficits. An exception was that processing speed 
showed modest relation to on-road outcome for all groups, including healthy controls.  
Adults with impaired awareness of their deficits rated their driving more highly than did 
adults with hypervigilance towards or intact awareness of their deficits. Significant-other 
ratings were strongly related to use of driving limitations among survivors with impaired 
awareness of their deficits, consistent with findings that the caregivers “hold the keys.”   
Awareness of deficit has a considerable influence on driving outcomes both 
directly and as a moderator between the relationship of neuropsychological functioning 
and driving performance. When adults with ABI lack appreciation for their impairments, 
their neuropsychological status is especially important in predicting driving outcomes. 
Even minor deficits, if not recognized and compensated for appropriately, can increase 
driving risk substantially. 
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